In this paper, we study a strategic model of marketing and product consumption in social networks. We consider two firms in a market competing to maximize the consumption of their products. Each firm has a limited budget which can be invested on the quality of the product or spent on seeding key individuals in the network to incentivize others to consume more of their product. After the decision of firms, agents choose their consumptions following a myopic best response dynamics which results in a local, linear update for their consumption decision. We characterize the unique Nash equilibrium of the game between firms and study the effect of the budgets as well as the network structure on the optimal allocation. We show that at the equilibrium, firms invest more budget on quality when their budgets are close to each other. However, as the gap between budgets widens, competition in qualities becomes less effective and firms spend more of their budget on seeding. We also show that given equal budget of firms, if the seeding budget is nonzero for a balanced graph, it will also be nonzero for any other graph, and if the seeding budget is zero for a star graph it will be zero for any other graph as well. As a practical extension, we then consider a similar setup for two products that are already being offered with some preset qualities in a network. At some point in time, firms learn about the network structure and decide to utilize a limited budget to mount their market share by either improving the quality or new seeding some agents to incline consumers toward their products. We show that the optimal budget allocation in this case simplifies to a threshold strategy. Interestingly, we derive similar results to those of the original problem, in which preset qualities simulate the role that budgets had in the original setup.
I. INTRODUCTION
M ANY recent studies have documented the role of social networks in individual purchasing decisions [3] - [5] . More data from online social networks and advances in information technologies have drawn the attention of firms to exploit this information for their marketing goals. As a result, firms have become more interested in models of influence spread in social networks in order to improve their marketing strategies.
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A main feature of product consumption in these settings is what is often called the "network effect" or positive externality. For such products, consumption of each agent incentivizes the neighboring agents to consume more as well, as the consumption decisions between agents and their neighbors are strategic complements of each other. There are diverse sets of examples for such products or services. New technologies and innovations, mobile applications (e.g., Viber, WhatsApp), online games (e.g., Warcraft), social network websites (e.g., Facebook, Twitter), and online dating services (e.g., Zoosk, Match.com, OkCupid) are among many examples in which consuming from a common product or service is more preferable for people.
Also, a main property of many products is substitution. A substitute product is a product or service that satisfies the need of a consumer that another product or service fulfills (e.g., Viber and WhatsApp or Gmail and Yahoo email accounts). In all of these examples, firms might be interested in utilizing the social network among consumers and the positive externality of their products and services to incentivize a larger consumption of their products compared to rival substitute products. Therefore, it is important for firms to know how to shape their strategies in designing their products and offering them to a set of people in order to promote their products intelligently, and eventually achieving a larger share in the market.
In this paper, we study strategic competition between two firms trying to maximize their product consumption. Firms simultaneously allocate their fixed budgets between seeding a set of costumers embedded in a social network and designing the quality of their products. The consumption of each agent is the result of its myopic best response to the previous actions of its peers in the network. Therefore, a firm should provide enough incentives for spreading its product through the payoff that agents receive by consuming it. For this purpose and considering their budgets, firms should strategically design their products and know how to initially seed the network.
We model the aforementioned problem as a fixed-sum game between firms, where each firm tries to maximize a discounted sum of its product consumption over time, considering its fixed budget. We describe the unique Nash equilibrium of the game between firms which depends on the budgets of the firms and the network structure. We show that at the Nash equilibrium, firms spend more budget on quality when their budgets are close. However, as the difference between budgets increases, 2325-5870 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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firms spend more budget on seeding. We also show that given an equal budget of firms, if the seeding budget is nonzero for a balanced graph, it will also be nonzero for any other graph, and if the seeding budget is zero for a star graph, it will be zero for any other graph too. Next, we study a different scenario in which firms produce products with some preset qualities. At some point in time, firms learn about the network structure and dedicate some budget to increase their product consumption. The budget can be spent on a new seeding of agents in the social network and marginally improving the quality of the products. We derive a simple rule for optimal allocation of the budget between improving the quality and new seeding which, in particular, depends on the network structure and preset qualities of the products. We show that the optimal allocation of the budget depends on the entire centrality distribution of the graph. Especially, we show that maximum seeding occurs in a graph with a maximum number of agents with centralities above a certain threshold. Also, the difference in qualities of firms plays an important role in the optimal allocation of the budget. In particular, we show that as the gap between the qualities of the products widens, the firms allocate more budget to seeding. We see that the budgets in the first scenario and preset qualities of the second scenario play similar roles in the optimal allocation. It is worth noting that the problem of influence and spread in networks has been extensively studied over the past few years [6] - [12] . Also, the diffusion of new behaviors and strategies through local coordination games has been an active field of research [13] - [20] . In [21] , the authors showed that the contagion of an action depends on the connectivity distributions of a random network. Also, in [22] , the authors provided an
The main contribution of our work is to explicitly study the tradeoff between investing on quality of a product and initial seeding in a social network. Our model is similar to the model proposed in [30] ; however, instead of pricing strategy in [30] , the notion of quality is introduced and the tradeoff between quality and seeding is studied. Also, our model is tractable and allows us to characterize the exact product consumption at each time, instead of lower and upper bounds provided in [31] and [32] . Furthermore, the model in this paper considers discounted utilities of firms over time instead of utilities of firms at a fixed finite time horizon assumed in [31] and [32] .
II. SPREAD DYNAMICS
There are n agents V = {1, . . . , n} in a social network. The relationship among agents is represented by a directed graph
The weighted adjacency matrix of the graph G is denoted by a row stochastic matrix G where the ijth entry of G, denoted by g ij , represents the strength of the influence of agent j on i. For diagonal elements of matrix G, we have g ii = 0 for all agents i ∈ V . We assume that there are two competing firms a and b producing product a and b. Each agent has one unit demand which can be supplied by either firm. We define the variable 0 ≤ x i (t) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ 1 − x i (t) ≤ 1 as the consumption of the product a and b by agent i at time t.
Denote by q a , q b ≥ > 0 the quality of product a and b, respectively, where has an infinitesimal value. The values of q a and q b can be interpreted as the payoff that any two agents i and j would achieve if they both consume the same product. In other words, we can assume q a and q b are payoffs of the following game:
Since agents benefit from the same action of their neighbors, this game could be thought of as a local coordination game. From the above table, it follows easily that the payoff of agents i and j from their interaction is
We also assume that each agent benefits from taking action x i irrespective of actions taken by its neighbors. We assume the isolation payoff of consuming x i and 1 − x i from product a and b is represented by the following quadratic form functions:
where α and β are parameters of the isolation payoff. This form of payoff indicates that a product with higher quality has a higher isolation payoff. The total isolation payoff of agent i can be written as
In order to have a non-negative isolation payoff for x i = 0 and x i = 1, we assume β ≤ α. Assuming a quadratic form function for the isolation payoff not only makes the analysis more tractable, but also is a good second-order approximation for the general class of concave payoff functions. By changing the variables x i = (1/2) + y i after simplification, we get 1
Therefore, the total utility of agent i from taking action y i is given by
In the above equation, y −i denotes an action vector of all agents other than agent i. From (1) we can see that products a and b have a positive externality effect in the network, meaning that the usage level of an agent has a positive impact on the usage level of its neighbors. Therefore, it follows that q a and q b in addition to the payoff of a local coordination game, can be interpreted as coefficients of network externality of product a and b, respectively.
We assume agents repeatedly apply myopic best response to the actions of their neighbors. This means that each agent, considering its neighbors consumptions at the current period, chooses the amount of the product that maximizes its current payoff, as its consumption for the next period. In other words, consumption of agent i at time t + 1 is updated as follows:
The above equation results in the following update dynamics:
Therefore, the consumption of the product a can be written as the following linear update dynamics form:
Similarly, for the consumption of the product b, we have 1 − x i (t) = (1/2) − y i (t).
Assumption 1: We assume 1 + α ≤ 2β. This assumption guarantees that 0 ≤ x i (t) ≤ 1 for all i and all t under the update rule (2).
Using the above assumption and defining
1 It is easy to see that the isolation payoff is maximized at y i = ((qa − q b ) (α−β))/2β(qa +q b ). Therefore, the consumption based only on the isolation payoff is more inclined toward the product with higher quality noting α > β. The amount of deviation can be controlled by design parameters α and β.
(2) can be written as
The above equation can be expanded as
Therefore, the consumption of agents depends on the initial preferences, that is, y(0), the quality of product a and b, that is, q a and q b , and the structure of the network, that is, the matrix G.
In the next section, we discuss how firms can exploit this information in order to maximize their product consumption and characterize the unique Nash equilibrium of the game played between two firms.
III. OPTIMAL BUDGET ALLOCATION
In this section, we describe the game between firms where each firm aims to maximize the consumption of its product over an infinite time horizon given a fixed budget. Each firm has an initial budget that it can either invest on "quality" or spend it on promoting its product by seeding some of the agents, or both. This initial seeding can be viewed as free offers to promote the products in the network. We define the utility of each firm as the discounted sum of its product consumption over time
Each firm has a limited budget K a , K b that it can spend on either initial seeding, that is, S a and S b , or designing the quality of its product, that is, q a and q b , or both. Seeding S a and S b will change the initial consumption of products a and b by S a − S b and S b − S a , respectively. Therefore, the amount that agents initially consume from product a and b will be x(0) = (0.5) 1 + S a − S b and 1 − x(0) = (0.5) 1 + S b − S a . This means that if both firms seed an agent equally, then the agent has no preference for one product over the other, that is, y(0) = 0. This assumption can be justified since agents should be initially indifferent between products before their consumption and realizing the quality of products if initial seedings by firms are equal. In order to have 0 ≤ x i (0) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ 1 − x i (0) ≤ 1 for all agents i, we impose the constraints S a ∞ ≤ 0.5 and S b ∞ ≤ 0.5. This means that firms can initially seed agents up to their demand capacity which is 0.5 for all agents. Using where agents are ordered from the highest to the lowest centrality, that is, v 1 ≥ v 2 ≥ · · · ≥ v n , and noting that v i = 2βn/(2β − δ), the utilities of firms can be written as
We assume the cost of each unit of quality is given by c q and the cost of each unit of initial seeding is given by c s . Therefore, the game between the firms can be written as
for firm a, and
Similarly, for firm b, we have
Remark 1: It can be easily shown that for a seeding budget S a 1 , the optimal seeding strategy is to seed the agents in the order of their centralities (from highest to lowest) until we either ran out of budget or all of the agents are seeded. Therefore, an optimal action ( S a , q a ) is fully determined from ( S a 1 , q a ), thus reducing the action space of firm a to only q a , given its budget constraint. A similar argument holds for firm b. Therefore, we may look at the utilities U a and U b as functions of (q a , q b ) under the optimal seeding and fixed budgets.
In order to study the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for the above game, we use a variation of the wellknown Sion's minimax theorem (see [33] for the original Sion's theorem) as below.
Lemma 1: Consider a two person zero-sum game, on closed, bounded, and convex finite-dimensional action sets Ω 1 × Ω 2 , defined by the continuous function L(x 1 , x 2 ). Let L(x 1 , x 2 ) be strictly convex in x 1 for each x 2 ∈ Ω 2 and strictly concave in x 2 for each x 1 ∈ Ω 1 . Then, the game admits a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof: See [34, Theor. A.4]. In the following theorem, we characterize the Nash equilibrium of the game played between firms.
Theorem 1: Consider firms a and b with utility functions U a and U b as described in (5) . The game between firms admits a unique Nash equilibrium of the form
Given the optimal seeding of each firm, that is, seeding agents from the highest to the lowest centrality, as discussed in Remark 1, the tradeoff between seeding amount and quality can be solved by optimizing U a and U b with respect to q a and q b , respectively. The action space of firms, that is, ≤
the game is a fixed-sum game and can be transformed to a zero sum game by subtracting the constant value of n/2(1−δ) from U a and U b . The term v T S a in U a is piecewise linear in S a 1 and, thus, in q a , under optimal seeding. Using this, it is easy to see that U a (q a , q b ) is strictly concave in q a for each q b , and strictly convex in q b for each q a via a similar argument. Therefore, based on Lemma 1, the game admits a unique Nash equilibrium. Assume that the first (k−1) and (l−1) agents are fully seeded by firms a and b, respectively, at equilibrium. Then, from the budget constraints, we have S *
; therefore, by plugging in the vector of optimal seeding S * a and S * b as described earlier, the optimization problem of firms is given by
If 0 < S * a k < 1/2 and 0 < S * b l < 1/2, the first-order optimality condition requires taking the derivative of the two equations above with respect to q a and q b and setting them to zero
Solving the equations above, we get
where 1 ≤ k, l ≤ n are integers that must satisfy conditions in (8) 
and if S * a n = 1/2 or S * b n = 1/2, thenṽ n ≤ v n . We can solve q * a and q * b in terms ofṽ k andṽ l as described in (7). Corollary 1: If firms have equal budgets K a = K b = K, then in the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game between firms, we have (7) indicates that the Nash equilibrium depends on both the budgets of the firms, that is, K a and K b and centrality distribution of agents in the network, that is, v. We will discuss the effect of each factor on the Nash equilibrium in the following subsections. All of our analysis here is for firm a, and similar results can be shown for firm b as well. For simplicity, we only discuss the seeding budget; the quality budget can be found easily using the budget constraint.
A. Effect of Budget of Firms on Firms' Decisions
In this subsection, we study how the budget of each firm, that is, K a and K b , can influence the Nash equilibrium. As can be seen from (7), the Nash equilibrium depends on bothṽ k andṽ l which, in turn, depend on the firm's and its rival's budgets, that is, both K a and K b . In the first proposition, we compare the seeding budget and quality of two firms at the Nash equilibrium with respect to their budgets. We first prove the following lemma.
, then from (7), we haveṽ l <ṽ k . Ifṽ l <ṽ k , then either k <l or l = k. If k <l, it is obvious to see that S * a ≤ S * b . If l = k, then we have two cases: If 0 < S * a k < 1/2, then based on (9), we haveṽ k = v k = v l ≤ṽ l , which is in contradiction with v l <ṽ k . If S * a k = 0, then obviously S * a k ≤ S * b l and, therefore, 3 We
The next proposition states that the firm with a higher budget surpasses the rival in both quality and seeding.
Proposition 1: The firm with a higher budget has higher seeding budget and quality, that is, if
This completes the proof.
In the next proposition, we explain how the seeding budget and quality at the Nash equilibrium vary with K a and K b .
Proposition 2: Given a fixed graph, the optimal seeding S * a 1 and quality q * a at the Nash equilibrium are increasing functions of K a . Furthermore, S * a 1 is a decreasing function of
(and, as a result,ṽ k andṽ l ) are continuous functions of K a and K b . To see this, let B(q a , q b , K a , K b ) denote the best response of the firms to qualities (q a , q b ) when the budgets are (K a , K b ). It follows from the continuity of the best response and compactness of action spaces that the set
If K a marginally increases, then, using the continuity of the equilibrium, the level k and, as a result,ṽ k does not change. Thus, given fixed K b , the constraint for firm b in (8) and, hence,ṽ l does not change. Therefore, if K a marginally increases, from the Nash equilibrium in (7) , q * a does not change and S * a k marginally increases. If S * a k = 0 and v k <ṽ k < v k−1 , and K a marginally increases, from the continuity of Nash, we still have v k <ṽ k < v k−1 and, as a result, S * a k = 0 does not change and, hence, q * a marginally increases. If S * a k = 0 andṽ k = v k orṽ k = v k−1 , and K a marginally increases, either we have v k <ṽ k < v k−1 which means S * a k = 0 does not change and q * a marginally increases, orṽ k does not change. In this latter case, given the fixed budget K b , the constraint for firm b in (8) will remain unchanged and, hence, v l will not change. Therefore, from the Nash equilibrium in (7), q * a does not change and, as a result, S * a k marginally increases. It is to be noted here that the cases whereṽ k moves above v k−1 or below v k are not feasible as they will cause a jump in the seeding budget, contradicting the continuity of equilibrium. The analysis for the case when S * a n = 1/2 andṽ n ≤ v n is quite similar. Therefore, ∂ S * a 1 /∂K a ≥ 0 and ∂q * a /∂K a ≥ 0. For the second part of the proposition, if S * a k = 0 and v k < v k < v k−1 and K b marginally increases, from continuity ofṽ k , we still have v k <ṽ k < v k−1 and, therefore, S * a k = 0 and given the fixed K a , q * a does not change. Hence, we only need to consider the case where 0 < S * a k < 1/2 andṽ k = v k , or S * a k = 0 andṽ k = v k orṽ k = v k−1 . In these cases, it is easy to see that eitherṽ k or S * a k remains unchanged. In the latter case (given the fixed K a ), q * a does not change. A similar argument holds for when S * a n = 1/2 andṽ n ≤ v n . Therefore, we only need to consider the case whereṽ k does not change. From the first part of the proposition, q * b is an increasing function of
and K b marginally increases, (10) implies that q * a must marginally increase (decrease) or does not change so thatṽ k remains fixed. Hence, given constant K a , S * a k marginally decreases (increases) or does not change. Therefore,
. Proposition 2 implies that when K b ≤ K a , the higher the budget of the rival firm, the lower the seeding budget of firm a, that is, if
On the other hand, when competing with a firm which has a higher budget, that is, K a ≤ K b , the higher the budget of the rival firm, the higher firm a should spend on seeding. In other
Combining these two results, we can see that given a fixed value of K a , the seeding budget of firm a is increasing with the difference |K a − K b |. The seeding budget attains its minimum when K b = K a , implying that the firm should allocate more budget to quality to distance itself from the rival firm. However, as the gap between the budget widens, competition in qualities becomes less effective and firms spend more of their budgets on seeding.
B. Effect of Network Structure on Firms' Decisions
In this subsection, we study the effect of network structure on the Nash equilibrium. Since we already studied the effect of the budget on the Nash equilibrium, for the rest of this subsection, we assume K a = K b = K so that we can observe only the effect of the network structure. We first focus on two wellstudied graphs, that is, star and balanced graphs, and highlight how they can reflect important properties of the seeding budget. Before continuing further, we first formally define these two graphs and find their network centralities in the next lemma.
Definition 1: A star graph is a directed graph in which there is an edge from any noncentral agent i ∈ V − {j} to the central agent j with the weight g ij = 1 and there are edges from the central agent j to all noncentral agents i ∈ V − {j} such that i g ji = 1. Definition 2: A balanced graph is a directed graph in which the in-degree of each agent is equal to its out-degree, that is,
The centrality of the agents in a balanced graph is given byv = 2β/(2β − δ). In a star graph, the centrality of the central agent is Moreover, for any arbitrary graph G,v ≤ v 1 ≤ v s h . Proof: The first part simply follows from the fact that v = (I − δW T ) −1 1, where W is given by (3), and that for any agent i in a balanced graph g ji = g ij = 1. For the star graph, noting that v = 1 + δW T v, we can obtain
solving which we can find v s h and v s l as given in the lemma. Also, for any arbitrary graph G, v 1 
Applying simple algebra along with the fact that v j = 2βn/ (2β − δ) leads to v 1 ≤ v s h . The next proposition provides a condition for seeding profitability of any general graph. Also, the seeding budget of star and balanced graphs is compared and it is shown that the graph with a higher seeding budget can be any of the two, depending on the budget. Proposition 3: If the seeding budget is nonzero for a balanced graph, it will be nonzero for any other graph too. On the other hand, if the seeding budget is zero for a star graph, it will also be zero for any other graph. Moreover, if (1/2) + (λ/2v) < K/c s < (n/2) + (λ/2v s l ), a balanced graph has a larger seeding budget than a star graph, and if λ/2v s h < K/c s < (1/2) + (λ/2v), a star graph has a larger seeding budget than a balanced graph. For (n/2) + (λ/2v s l ) < K/c s < (n/2) + (λ/2), they have the same seeding budget.
Proof: If the seeding budget is nonzero for a balanced graph, then according to (12) , we have λ/2v < K/c s . As a result, for any other graph, we will have λ/2v 1 < K/c s , since according to Lemma 3v ≤ v 1 . This means that there exists at least one agent that must be seeded. On the other hand, if the seeding budget is zero for a star graph, then we must have K/c s ≤ λ/2v s h . Since we know v s h ≥ v i for any agent i of any arbitrary graph, therefore, K/c s ≤ λ/2v i and no agent can be seeded in any other graph.
For the second part of the proposition, denote quality and seeding budget of the balanced and star graphs by q r , S r 1 and q s , S s 1 , respectively. If (1/2) + (λ/2v) < K/c s < (n/2) + (λ/2v s l ), then the seeding budget is nonzero for a balanced graph and, hence, q r = (c s /c q )(λ/2v). This implies S r 1 = (K/c s ) − (λ/2v) > 1/2. For a star graph, (1/2) + (λ/2v) < K/c s < (n/2) + (λ/2v s l ) implies (1/2) + (λ/2v s h ) < K/c s . Therefore, the central agent in the star graph must be seeded, that is, S a 1 = 1/2. If S a 2 = 0, then S s 1 = 1/2 and clearly S s 1 < S r 1 . If S a 2 > 0, then a noncentral agent must be seeded and we must have q s = (c s /c q )(λ/2v s l ). This implies q r < q s and, as a result, S s 1 < S r 1 .
If λ/2v s h < K/c s < (1/2)+(λ/2v), then we have two cases. If K/c s ≤ λ/2v, then S r 1 = 0. On the other hand, S s 1 > 0 since λ/2v s h < K/c s . Therefore, clearly S r 1 < S s 1 . So let us assume λ/2v < K/c s < (1/2) + (λ/2v). This implies that the seeding budget is nonzero for a balanced graph and, hence, q r = (c s /c q )(λ/2v). As a result, S r 1 = (K/c s )−(λ/2v) < 1/2. Now again, consider two cases. If K/c s < (1/2) + (λ/2v s h ), then q s = (c s /c q )(λ/2v s h ) and, hence, q s < q r . This implies S r 1 < S s 1 . Otherwise, if (1/2) + (λ/2v s h ) ≤ K/c s , then S s 1 ≥ 1/2. As a result, again we have S r 1 < 1/2 ≤ S s 1 .
If (n/2) + (λ/2v s l ) < K/c s < (n/2) + (λ/2), then all agents in the star graph are seeded up to the agents' maximum demand capacities which is 0.5 for each agent. Also, since v s l <v, we have (n/2) + (λ/2v) < K/c s . Hence, all agents in the balanced graph are also seeded up to the agents' maximum demand capacities. Therefore, both graphs have the same seeding budget. This completes the proof.
The next proposition provides us with a lower and an upper bound for a minimum and maximum seeding budget. In order to characterize the graphs with maximum and minimum seedings for a given budget K, we need to introduce a few notations first.
Definition 3: Define v max l = max v l , that is, the maximum of the lth centrality v l among all possible graphs subject to v i = 2βn/(2β − δ). We can see that
for l ≥ 2. Similarly, define v min l = min v l , that is, the minimum of the lth centrality v l among all possible graphs subject to v i = 2βn/(2β −δ). It is easy to see that v min The minimum seeding budget occurs in any graph for whichṽ l =ṽ min l . An example for such graphs is the balanced graph for l = 1, the star graph for l = 2, and any graph with n − 2 agents with centrality of one for l ≥ 3. 5 Proof: Let G be a graph attaining the maximum seeding (thus the minimum quality) and denote its corresponding equilibrium with (l ,ṽ l ). Note that l ≥ l, since in a graph withṽ l = v max l , the first (l − 1) agents are fully seeded. Now, if l > l,
and v max l ≤ṽ max l it follows that v l ≤ṽ max l . But then both pairs (l ,ṽ l ) and (l,ṽ max l ) cannot satisfy (12) . Therefore, in a graph with maximum seeding, we should have l = l. Now, ifṽ max l <ṽ l , then v max l <ṽ l ≤ v max l−1 , which contradicts the uniqueness of the pair (l,ṽ max l ). To complete the proof, we also need to show thatṽ l =ṽ max l is achievable. It is quite straightforward to show that for v max l = v max l an l-star graph with v 1 = · · · = v l = v max l , and forṽ max l > v max l an (l − 1)-star graph with v 1 = · · · = v l−1 = v max l−1 admit (l,ṽ max l ) as the equilibrium. The proof for the minimum seeding budget is similar. Example 1: As a numerical example for the minimum and maximum seeding budgets, we consider a network with n = 15 agents with budget K = 2, quality and seeding costs of c s = c q = 1, and parameters of α = β = 1 and δ = 0.5. For this example from (6), we have λ = 5. As a result, we can see that for l = 3 and v max 3 = 8/3 from (13), condition 0 < S * a 3 = 1/16 < 1/2 in (12) is satisfied. Therefore, a graph with the maximum seeding budget is a 3-star with the seeding budget of 17/16 as illustrated in Fig. 1 . Also, we can see that for l = 1 and v = 4/3, condition 0 < S * a 1 = 1/8 < 1/2 in (12) is satisfied. Thus, the balanced graph has a minimum seeding budget of 1/8. Given v s h = 4.8 and v s l = 1.08, it can be seen that in star graph v 2 = 5/3, and the star graph has a seeding budget of 0.5, which is neither a minimum nor a maximum.
As we saw, the structure of the graphs with a minimum and maximum seeding budget depends on the budget. However, for certain values of budget K, the seeding budget will be independent of the structure of the graph, as described in the next proposition. Proof: The maximum possible centrality occurs for the central agent of the star graph as shown in Lemma 3. As a result, if K/c s < λ/2v s h , then we have K/c s < λ/2v i for all i in any graph, and from condition (12) , no agent can be seeded. Also, since from definition 1 ≤ v i for all i, if K/c s > (1/2) + (λ/2), then we have K/c s > (n/2) + (λ/2v i ) for all agents in any graph, and any graph can be seeded up to the agents' maximum demand capacities, which is 0.5 for each agent.
IV. SEEDING VERSUS QUALITY IMPROVEMENT
In this section, we describe a scenario in which firms have already produced their products with some preset quality. We assume at some point in time, say t = 0, firms learn about the network structure and utilize a fixed budget to maximize their marginal utility by either marginally "improving the quality" of their products or new seeding some agents to change their consumption toward their products or both. Since the products have been in the market for a while, we assume agents have already decided on their consumption from products a and b, which are denoted by x(0) and 1 − x(0), respectively. Each firm has a limited budget, that is, K a and K b that can spend on either a new seeding, that is, S a and S b , or enhancing the quality of its product, that is, Δq a and Δq b , or both. New seeding S a and S b will change the initial consumption of products a and b by S a − S b and S b − S a , respectively. In order to have 0 ≤ x i (0) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ 1 − x i (0) ≤ 1 for all agents i, we impose the constraints S a + y(0) ∞ ≤ 0.5 and S b − y(0) ∞ ≤ 0.5. This means that firms can initially seed agents up to their demand capacity. From (5) , the marginal change in the utility of firm a and b resulting from the new budget K a and K b is given by
We assume the cost of improving the quality by Δq is given by c q Δq, and c q is a large number, and the cost of each unit of new seeding is given by c s . Each firm maximizes its marginal utility given its fixed budget. Since the effect of the action of firm b, that is, S b and Δq b is decoupled from that of the action of firm a in ΔU a , firm a should thus solve the following optimization problem:
From (14) and (15), it can be seen that the optimal strategy of each firm is independent of the action of the other firm. It is to be noted that despite the independence of the actions, the optimal strategy of each firm depends on the state (i.e., quality) of the rival firm. This results in a Nash equilibrium to be simply the pair of the optimal actions of the firms. In the next theorem, we describe a simple rule for the optimal allocation of the budget for each firm and discuss the resulting Nash equilibrium. Theorem 2: For firm a, it is more profitable to seed agent j rather than enhancing the quality of its
Similarly, for firm b, it is more profitable to seed agent j rather than enhancing the quality of its product if
Moreover, any pair of optimal strategies of the firms described by the aforementioned threshold rules describes a Nash equilibrium. Proof: From (14) and (15), the relative marginal utility to cost for spending budget to seed agent j is v j /c s . Therefore, it is always more profitable to seed an agent with higher centrality. Also, the relative marginal utility to cost for spending budget on enhancing the quality of product a is 2λq b /(c q (q a + q b ) 2 ) according to (14) . Therefore, for firm a, it is more profitable to seed agent j rather than enhancing the quality of its product iff
This completes the proof. A similar story holds for firm b. Moreover, since the best response of each firm resulting from (14) and (15) is independent of the action of the other firm, any Nash equilibrium of the game between firms is simply a pair of firms' best responses.
Corollary 2: If firms have equal qualities q a = q b = q, for both firms a and b, it is more profitable to seed agent j rather than enhancing the quality of their
Moreover, any pair of optimal strategies of the firms described by the above threshold rules describes a Nash equilibrium.
with qualities in Section III
we can see a similarity as follows: In (19) , q a and q b determine v a c and v b c which, in turn, determine the tradeoff between S and Δq according to Theorem 2. In Section III, K a and K b determineṽ k andṽ l based on the inequalities in (8) andṽ k andṽ l determine q * a and q * a according to (20) , which, in turn, determine the tradeoff between S and q based on the budget constraint. Therefore, as will be discussed later, we can achieve similar results for the effect of q a and q b on the optimal budget allocation, as we did for the effect of K a and K b on the Nash equilibrium.
Following the above theorem, the optimal allocation of the budget for each firm is to follow a so-called water-filling strategy, that is, to start seeding in the order of agents' centralities until the centrality falls below the threshold given by (16) for firm a or (17) for firm b (in which case, the firm spends the rest of the budget on improving the quality), or the firm runs out of budget. Also, the amount that agents can be seeded is up to their demand capacity, that is, S max a = (0.5) 1 − y(0) > 0 and S max b = (0.5) 1 + y(0) > 0. Also, note that if the centrality of any agent is equal to the threshold defined in (16) or (17) , then firms are indifferent between seeding that agent and quality improvement. Equations (16) and (17) indicate that the optimal allocation depends on the quality of products, that is, q a and q b and centrality distribution of agents in the network, that is, v.
In what follows, we will study the effect of each factor on the optimal allocation of the firms in more detail. All of our analysis here is for firm a, and similar results can be shown for firm b as well. For simplicity, we only discuss an optimal seeding budget; an optimal quality improvement budget can be found easily using the budget constraint.
A. Effect of Quality of Products on Firms' Decisions
In this subsection, we study how the quality of each product, that is, q a and q b , can influence the optimal allocation of seeding and quality improvement budgets.
As can be seen from (16) , the threshold v a c depends on both firms' and their rivals' qualities, that is, both q a and q b . In the next proposition, we compare the seeding budget of two firms in the optimal allocation with respect to their qualities.
Proposition 6: Given an equal budget, the firm with higher quality also has higher seeding budget, that is, if q a ≤ q b , then S * a 1 ≤ S * b 1 . Proof: From (16) and (17), it can be easily seen that if q a ≤ q b ,
As a result, more agents satisfy the condition (17) for firm b compared to firm a and, therefore, S * a 1 ≤ S * b 1 . This result is due to diminishing return of quality which means if a firm already has a high quality, it would profit less by spending on quality improvement and it would be better for the firm to invest on seeding. Also, note that the result of Proposition 6 is similar to the result of Proposition 1. The only difference is that instead of budgets K a and K b in Proposition 1, qualities q a and q b in Proposition 6 play the role of the budgets while comparing the seedings of the firms.
In the next proposition, we explain how the optimal seeding budget varies with q a and q b .
Proposition 7: Given a fixed graph, the optimal seeding budget is an increasing function of q a . Furthermore, it is a decreasing function of q b if q b ≤ q a and an increasing function of
Proof: The optimal seeding budget is a decreasing function of the threshold value v a c . Also, it is easy to see that the threshold value of v a c is a decreasing function of q a . This implies the first part of the proposition. For the second part, it is easy to see that the threshold value of v a c is an increasing function of the quality of product b, when q b ≤ q a and a decreasing function of the quality of product b, when q b ≥ q a . This completes the proof. Proposition 7 implies that a higher quality in a firm's product results in a higher seeding budget in the optimal allocation. This can be due to the diminishing return of quality: when quality is higher, there is less of a need for quality improvement and it would be more profitable to spend on seeding. Furthermore, when q b ≤ q a , the higher the quality of the rival firm's product, the lower the seeding budget of firm a, that is, if
On the other hand, when competing with a firm whose product has a higher quality, that is, q b ≥ q a , the higher the quality of the rival firm's product, the higher firm a should spend on seeding. In other words, if
Combining these two results, we can see that given a fixed value of q a , the seeding budget of firm a is increasing with the difference |q a − q b |. The seeding budget attains its minimum when q b = q a , implying that the firm should allocate more budget to quality improvement to distance itself from the rival firm. However, as the gap between qualities widens, competition in qualities becomes less effective and firms spend more budget on seeding. Also, note that the result of Proposition 7 is similar to the result of Proposition 2. The only difference is that seeding budgets vary with q a and q b in Proposition 7, whereas they vary with K a and K b in Proposition 2.
B. Effect of Network Structure on Firms' Decisions
In this subsection, we study the effect of network structure on the optimal allocation of the budget for seeding and quality improvement. First, we define seeding capacity of a graph.
Definition 4: The seeding capacity of a graph is the amount that can be seeded in the optimal allocation when there is no budget constraint.
Having no budget constraint implies that a firm stops seeding not because it runs out of budget, but when investing in quality becomes more profitable than seeding. In other words, seeding capacity of a graph is equal to the seeding budget of a firm, in the optimal allocation, with enough budget to make all profitable seeding investments. Therefore, seeding capacities are fully characterized by the demand capacities of the individuals with centralities above the thresholds given by (16) and (17) .
We first focus on two well-studied graphs, that is, star and balanced graphs, and highlight how they can reflect important properties of the seeding budget. The next proposition provides a condition for seeding profitability of any general graph. Also, the seeding capacity of star and balanced graphs is compared and it is shown that the graph with higher seeding capacity can be any of the two, depending on the threshold value of v a c in (16) . Proposition 8: If seeding capacity is nonzero for a balanced graph, it will be nonzero for any other graph too. On the other hand, if seeding capacity is zero for a star graph, it will also be zero for any other graph. Moreover, if v s l < v a c <v, a balanced graph has a larger seeding capacity than a star graph, and if v < v a c < v s h , a star graph has a larger seeding capacity than a balanced graph. For 1 < v a c < v s l , they have the same seeding capacity.
Proof: If seeding capacity is nonzero for a balanced graph, then we have v a c <v. As a result, for any other graph, we will have v a c < v max , where v max = max v i , since according to Lemma 3v ≤ v max . This means that there exists at least one agent that must be seeded. On the other hand, if seeding capacity is zero for a star graph, then we must have v a c > v s h . Since we know v s h ≥ v i for any agent i of any arbitrary graph, therefore, v a c > v i and no agent can be seeded in any other graph. For the second part of the proposition, if v s l < v a c <v, then seeding capacity for the star graph will be S max
≥ · · · ≥ S max a n are elements of the demand capacity vector S max a and agent i is the central agent. However, for the balanced graph, all agents can be seeded up to their maximum demand capacities and the seeding capacity will be S max a 1 . On the other hand, ifv < v a c < v s h , still seeding for the star graph will be S max a i , however, no agent can be seeded in the balanced graph. For 1 < v a c < v s l , agents in both graphs can be seeded up to S max a 1 . It is easy to see that Proposition 8 presents very similar results as Proposition 3. The next proposition provides us with a lower and an upper bound for minimum and maximum seeding capacities.
Proposition 9: If 1 < v a c < v s h , the maximum seeding capacity is given by
, n .
On the other hand, the minimum seeding capacity is S max a n + S max (16) , the more agents with centralities above the threshold v a c , the more seeding budget can be allocated. Therefore, the maximum number of k agents with centralities above the threshold v a c must be found. Since v i ≥ 1 for all agents, first a centrality of one is given to each agent and then the remainder of the centrality sum is distributed among a maximum number of agents so that each agent receives at least v a c − 1, making its overall centrality greater than v a c . It is easy to see that the number of such agents is upper bounded by
. This, along with the fact that 1 ≤ k ≤ n results in (21) . Note that in order to complete the proof, we should also provide an example achieving this maximum capacity. For k = 1, the maximum seeding capacity is clearly achieved by the star graph with the seeding capacity of S max a 1 . For k ≥ 2, a graph with largest seeding capacity is the one with k central agents having the largest demand capacities and with equal centralities of
where k is given in (21) , and the remainder n − k agents with the minimum centrality ofṽ s l = 1. For the graph with minimum seeding capacity, similar to the proof of Proposition 8, we have minimum seeding capacity of S max a n in star graph if v s l < v a c <v, and zero in balanced graph ifv < v a c < v s h . For the case where 1 < v a c < v s l , let i be the agent with the highest centrality. Clearly, v s l < v i ≤ v s h . Now, considering the fact that sum of the centralities is fixed, there is an agent j ∈ V − {i} for which v s l ≤ v j . This implies that there exist at least two agents whose centralities are above v a c . An example of a graph with exactly two centralities above v a c is a directed star graph where all edges are directed toward the center except one edge which goes both ways.
It can be seen from Propositions 9 and 4 that graphs with similar structures attain maximum and minimum seeding in both scenarios.
Example 2: As a numerical example for the minimum and maximum seeding capacities, we consider a network with n = 15 agents with demand capacity vectors of S max a = S max b = (0.5) 1, qualities of q a = q b = 1, quality and seeding costs of c s = c q = 1, and parameters of α = β = 1 and δ = 0.5. For this example from (16) and (17), we have v a c = v b c = 2.5 and, as a result, from (21) , we obtain k = 3. Therefore, a graph with the maximum seeding capacity is a 3-star with seeding capacity of 1.5 as illustrated in Fig. 1 . Also, sincev = 4/3 < v a c , v b c < v s h = 4.8, a balanced graph has the minimum seeding capacity of zero. A star graph has a seeding capacity of 0.5 which is neither a minimum nor a maximum.
Note that in both Examples 1 and 2, a graph with the maximum seeding budget and capacity is a 3-star graph and a graph with the minimum seeding budget and capacity is a balanced graph. A star graph has neither a minimum nor a maximum seeding budget and capacity in both examples.
As we saw, the structure of the graphs with minimum and maximum seeding capacity depends on the threshold value of v a c . However, for certain values of v a c , the seeding capacity will be independent of the structure of the graph, as described in the next proposition.
Proposition 10:
If v a c > v s h , no graph can be seeded. On the other hand, if v a c < 1, all graphs can be seeded equally up to agents' maximum demand capacities.
Proof: The maximum possible centrality occurs for the central agent of the star graph as shown in Lemma 3. As a result, if v a c > v s h , then we have v a c > v i for all i in any graph and from condition (16) , no agent can be seeded. Also, since from definition 1 ≤ v i , for all i, if v a c < 1, then we have v a c < v i for all agents in any graph, and any graph can be seeded up to agents' maximum demand capacities, given the availability of budget.
It is easy to see that Proposition 10 presents very similar results as Proposition 5.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed and studied a strategic model of marketing and product consumption in social networks. Two firms compete for maximizing the consumption of their products in a social network. Initially firms utilize a limited budget to either design the quality of their products or initially seed a set of agents in the social network. Agents are myopic yet utility maximizing, given the qualities of the products and actions of their neighbors. We described the unique Nash equilibrium of the game between firms. We used the equilibrium characterization to study the effect of the budgets and the network structure on the optimal allocation. Afterwards, we considered a similar scenario for two products that are already being offered with some preset qualities in a network. Firms can spend a limited budget to marginally improve the quality of their products and to give free offers to a set of agents in the network in order to promote their products. We derived a simple threshold rule for the optimal allocation of the budget between new seedings and quality improvement. We derived similar results to the original setup for this scenario, with preset qualities resembling the role of the budgets.
The competitive model of diffusion and consumption developed in this work can be used to study numerous interesting follow-up questions. One interesting extension is to study the budget allocation for the case where the budgets are generated endogenously. In this case, a firm can pay back for its investment from the revenue it generates over time. Therefore, the amount of investment itself becomes a decision variable which should be subtracted from the firm's utility. Another interesting avenue is to study the problem in the context of games of incomplete information. Instead of assuming the budgets to be common knowledge, each firm has a noisy observation from the rival firm's budget. Tons of interesting questions can be asked under this setup including the effect of the information precision on the optimal allocation, the value of information, and information disclosure to rival and information acquisition about the rival.
